"The Mind-Body Problem"

Overhead
  Fodor's article in January 81 "Scientific American".
  	(After overviewing this article, I'll discuss its content)
  Prof @ MIT in Psychology & Philosophy/Linguistics

Motivation - Philosophical article 
  Mentioned AI in intro
  I never understood dualism vs functionalism...,
	& these seemed relevant to discussions re: intelligent machines/people

Organization:
	Intro
	Describes & Critiques Prior Explanations
	The answer - functionalism
	Futher issues of Mind
(And I'll just give quick paraphrase of this, in order.
 See diagram)

	Content
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History
	Philosophy recent interest in explaining Psychological states
	Is mind material, or etherial?
  Dualist vs Materialists [Behavior & Identity]
			    ↑ Watson
Dualist: Mind is non-physical
  Problem: Violation of physical laws (conservation...)
	Mind-body causality
	Fallen from favor for other reasons as well.

Radical Behaviorist:
  Character:
	Only stimulus/response
	Role of Psy is catalog S/Rs.
  Plus:
	Better than ghosts
  Problem:
	No talk of mental causes/states, ...

Logical Behaviorist: Provides semantics to mental states:
  Character:
	Equates mental states with behavioral disposition
	Every mental ascription ≡ (in meaning) to  If/Then rule
	Translates mental language into language of S/R
  Plus:
	Provides a materialistic account of mental causation
  Problem:
	Insists there are NO mental causes
	  Does not account for all interactions [between of mental states] 116
	Does not allow abstraction
	  Requires open-ended # behavior hypotheticals
	   to spell out the behavior dispositions expressed by mental term

Central-State Identity Theorist: 
  Character:
	Mental causes ≡ neurophysiological events in brain
  Plus:
	Can have totally interal interactions [NOT leading to behaviour]
	So mental processes really physical
  Problem:
	Need abstraction - above level of neuron!
	Hardware based - how about Software?

Functionalist - from Cognitive Science
  Character:
	Not what stuff is made of, but how arranged.
	View of information processor - with states...
		Stuff comes in, states change, stuff goes out.
  Plus:
	Compatible with best of LB & C-SIT, but independent of material
		(and so extendable to other systems)
  Problem:
	Not untruth, just triviality
	  [If states only functionally defined, then like Homonculi ]
		Answer: must suggest mechanism itself
	Here Turing machine (well defined computation on discrete symbols)

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Questions re: Functionalism - 
1) Not limited to minds
2) Qualitative vs Quantitative Content [inverted spectrum - green/red]
	- if functionally the same, how to distinguish?
3) Handling of intentional content of mental states
	(propositions) - Functionalism has done well here.
	Basically: Symbols (they also have intentional content)
4) Issues of representation(al theory of the mind)
	Resemblence, and that set of problems ("tall"ness of John)
	Here Functionalism helps: semantics depending on function
		(↑ This seems central issue to empirical theories of the mind)

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Token Physicalism: All mental particular WHICH HAPPEN TO EXIST are
		 neurophysiological.
	Type Physicalism:  The only mental particulars must be neurophysiological.
   Hence Type P. dismisses machines & disembodies spirits, as no neurons